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1 Introduction 
 
 
'Bio-based' refers to the use of biomass as the main ingredient of a wide range of non-food products. A 
bio-based economy can be defined as one in which renewable biomass has replaced the use of fossil fuels 
in the production of such products as building materials, chemicals, lubricants, pharmaceutical products, 
energy and electricity. A bio-based economy is oriented towards the substitution of biologically derived 
materials and processes for the production of goods, with the aim of reducing the use of extracted 
minerals and petro-chemistry (Nowicki et al., 2008). The EU defines bio-based products in a report of the 
EU Taskforce on Bio-based Products (2007) as: 
 
Non-food products derived from biomass (plants, algae, crops, trees, marine organisms and 
biological waste from households, animals and food production). [These] may range from high-value 
added fine chemicals such as pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, food additives, et cetera to high volume 
materials such as general bio-polymers or chemical feedstocks. 
 
In 2005, bio-based products accounted for 7% of the global sales of the chemical sector (EU Taskforce on 
Bio-based Products, 2007). Sales were forecast to grow to 10% in 2010 and 20% in 2020.  
 After a somewhat sluggish and erratic start, the transition towards a bio-based economy seems to 
have finally taken off (Bos et al., 2008). The agricultural sector is playing a major role in the new bio-based 
economy by providing crops and waste streams as inputs to a wide range of other bio-based products. 
Numerous bio-refinery initiatives are being started, farmers are using fermentation technology to produce 
electricity and heat from waste streams such as manure and leaves, and biomass as input to the chemical 
industry is growing. These developments have a number of implications for primary producers and other 
stakeholders. First, they create new demand for existing products like corn, sugar beet and wheat. 
Second, they create a new demand for by-products and waste streams such as manure. Manure is already 
used in arable farming as a fertiliser, but in the Netherlands at a negative price to the manure suppliers. 
Other waste streams that are currently discarded as rubbish, might prove to be valuable sources of 
biomass. Third, they create a new demand for 'new' products such as cellulosic biomass crops and algae. 
Together, these new demands create an uncertain and complex context for the technology and 
organisation of production.  
 One of the challenges for the bio-based economy is to achieve production efficiency that can compete 
with fossil-based products. New scale-efficient product supply chains have to be created, or current supply 
chains have to be amended to incorporate the biomass supply chain. These new supply chains are more 
complex in nature than existing ones: 'In some cases, reliability of supply and quality of bio-based raw 
materials can cause producers and users to choose a less risky alternative.' (EU Taskforce on Bio-based 
Products, 2007)  
 This report looks at the economic and institutional factors that determine the costs and benefits of 
the various actors in new bio-based supply chains, with a special focus on risk, and at ways to model the 
economics of these supply chains. Only hypothetical data are used in this report. The research is part 
of the development of an economic model of bio-based supply chains. The research was funded by the 
Netherlands Ministry of Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation (KB-10 Bio-based). 
 Section 2 discusses profit maximisation as the basic underlying mechanism that determines the 
behaviour of actors in bio-based supply chains. It shows that there are alternative ways to coordinate 
demand and supply in bio-based supply chains. The coordination mechanism chosen is largely determined 
by transaction costs and risk. In section 3, institutional issues that are specific to bio-based supply chains 
are discussed in order to identify and understand the relevant risks and transaction costs. Risk and 
uncertainty are discussed in more detail in section 4. Based on the previous sections, section 5 provides 
a checklist of factors that have to be taken into account when setting up a bio-based supply chain. 
Moreover, it presents agroparks as a specific example of bio-based supply chains. Section 6 discusses 
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two explicit modelling issues: the choice between a contract and a free market in a bio-based supply 
chain, and how much to produce in a bio-based supply chain. For this, a mathematical programming model 
incorporates risk is discussed. Section 7 concludes. 
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2 Economic decisions 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This section discusses profit maximisation as the basic underlying mechanism that determines behaviour 
of actors in bio-based supply chains. Section 2.2 concerns the production decisions of individual actors in 
the bio-based supply chain, section 2.3 the investment decision, and section 2.4 the coordination of 
transactions within the bio-based supply chain.  
 
 
2.2 The production decision 
 
It is assumed that an individual firm maximises profit given a technology constraint and a market 
constraint (Varian, 1992). It is also assumed that all factor inputs (labour, land and capital) are fixed. This 
implies that the amount of capital, land and labour, both from agricultural and non-agricultural household 
sources, cannot change. This in turn implies that the farm maximises short-term profits. In the case of 
long-term profit maximisation, the farmer can adjust the amount of factor inputs (this is discussed in the 
following section). The technological constraint entails that the farm is restricted in maximising its profit by 
its technology, where technology is defined as the way inputs are converted into outputs. The market 
constraint entails that in the maximisation process, the farm takes the prices of inputs and outputs as 
exogenous; thus, it cannot set prices. This seems a reasonable assumption in agriculture where 
producers are small and have no market power. The outcome of the profit maximisation process 
(maximising the difference between the value of output minus the value of the variable inputs given 
technology, the quantity of fixed factor inputs and prices) is the so-called short-term or restricted profit 
function. Profit is derived as: 
 
, 1 1
max : ( ), 0, 0
N M
n n m m
n m
p y w x Tπ
= =
 
= − > > 
 
∑ ∑x y x, y, z p w  (1) 
 
with: 
π  : short-term or restricted profit;  
𝑝𝑛 and 𝑦𝑛  : the price and quantity of output n, n =1,..,N; 
𝑤𝑚and 𝑥𝑚 : the price and quantity of variable input m, m=1,..,M;  
x, y, z  : the vector of variable inputs, outputs and fixed factor inputs respectively; 
( )T x,y, z  : the technology set, i.e. possible combination of variable inputs, fixed factor inputs  
  and outputs;  
w,p   : the vector of prices of variable inputs and outputs, respectively. 
 
 Performing the optimisation in (1) results in the levels of outputs and variable inputs that correspond 
with the maximum level of profit. 
 The model presented here is a 'certainty model', that is, all prices and technologies are known and 
certain. When prices are uncertain, the profit maximisation may be an inappropriate behavioural 
assumption. 
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2.3 The investment decision 
 
Section 2.2 concerned the short-term profit maximisation of a firm. Here, we assume that the firm 
maximises profit over a fixed period T. In the most simple case, the firm decides in the first year(s) how 
much capital, land and labour to use in the following years based on the expected profits in future years. 
We also assume technology to be a given. These expected profits depend on the expectations regarding 
the future prices of inputs and outputs, as well as on such constraints as the availability of own labour 
and on credit constraints. This determines what the level of the fixed factor inputs will be in future years. 
In the following years, the firm maximises profit given these levels of fixed factor inputs as described in 
section 2.2.  
 Suppose the investment costs equal 0.tC = Optimal profit then equals:  
0
1 (1 )
eT
t
t t
t
NPV C
r
π
=
=
= − +
+∑  (2) 
  
with: 
NPV net present value of profit; etπ  expected profit in year t; r discount rate. 
 
We will not go into detail how to determine the optimal levels of fixed factor inputs. In a situation with 
perfectly working markets, a change in the quantities of factor inputs should be profitable and the marginal 
return of factor input should be equal to its price. In real-world situations, other economic and also 
institutional factors play a role. 
 In the case that there is a choice between technologies, a similar analysis can be made. For each 
technology, the profit maximising output and input levels are determined. A choice between the 
technologies can then be made. 
 
 
2.4 Coordination of transactions 
 
In a bio-based economy, individual firms do not operate in isolation. There are contacts with input suppliers 
and products are processed by specialised processors. Figure 2.1 presents a stylised supply chain with 
a farm that is using inputs (e.g. feed) from an input supplier to produce a product (e.g. manure) that is 
processed (e.g. in a biogas installation). 
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Figure 2.1 Stylised supply chain 
 
 
 In relation to the functioning of the price mechanism and the associated risks for the supply chain 
participants, an important issue is how the transactions between the firms in the supply chain are vertically 
coordinated. There are several options. 
 
Free market 
A market is defined as a system, institution or place where supply and demand meet to exchange goods 
or services. Two situations have to be taken into account. First, there are other suppliers and demanders, 
so there is no unique relationship between supplier and demander. In this case, the price is given both for 
demander and the supplier, and both could choose another trade partner. This would be the case with, for 
example, manure. There is a market for manure and the price is given for an individual demander or 
supplier. In the second situation, there are no other demanders or suppliers, in which case demander and 
supplier are dependent on each other and price formation takes place between them. The market may be 
segmented or physically split by transaction costs or transportation costs. When demanders and suppliers 
are located a short distance from each other, they can save on transport costs if they trade with each 
other. The alternative of finding a buyer or seller further away may be infeasible.  
 
Imperfect competition 
When price formation takes place between demander and supplier, it could be that one of them has 
market power. By changing demand or supply, the price can be manipulated such that profit is higher for 
the party that has market power than in the free market situation. Market power could come from 
transaction-specific investments made by either supplier or demander. The extra profit is at the cost of the 
trading partner. It is important to realise that maximising the overall profit of the supply chain would lead 
to a situation in which there is a free market. The reason for this is that with perfect competition, price is 
equal to marginal cost and this is the most efficient way to produce a certain amount of output, or the 
most efficient way to demand an amount of input. 
 Suppose we have one output and the minimum cost of producing this output is given by the cost 
function ( , )C y w . Profit the in case of monopoly power of the supplier is then given by: 
 
{ }max ( ) ( , )
y
p y y C yπ = − w  (3) 
 
Processor 
Input supplier 
Farm 
Demand for/supply of output 
Demand for/supply of input 
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The first order condition of profit maximisation is given by: 
 
( )( ) 0p Y Cp y y
y y
∂
∂
∂
+ × − =
∂
 (4) 
 
Rewriting gives that marginal cost equals price plus a mark-up. The mark-up equals the price divided by 
the price elasticity of demand: 
 
d
p Cp
yε
∂
+ =
∂
 (5) 
 
with: 
 
( , )C y w  minimum cost to produce output level y with variable input prices w and fixed factors; 
dε  elasticity of demand; C
y
∂
∂
 marginal cost of production. 
 
Contracts 
Instead of a market, transactions between demander and supplier can take the form of a contract (see 
Slangen et al. (2008) for a discussion). Although a free market is optimal from a welfare theoretical point 
of view, there can be reasons not to choose it. Several reasons to conclude contracts are:  
 
- to preclude one of the parties exercising market power, it could be decided to make an agreement on 
price;  
- to preclude one of the parties supplying or its products to or demanding products from a third party 
(harming the other party by opportunistic behaviour), the amount traded can be fixed or restricted by 
contract; 
- to reduce or spread the risks of trade; 
- to reduce transaction costs.  
 
 If high costs (e.g. negotiation costs) are linked to trade, the trading partners can decide to conclude 
a contract to reduce these costs. Although contracts can reduce transaction costs they also imply 
transaction costs (e.g. notary, enforcement); in some cases, the net transaction costs can even increase. 
 
Vertical integration 
An alternative to a market or contract is vertical integration. In that case, demand and supply takes place 
within a single firm. This too can be a way to reduce high transaction costs and/or risk. Vertical integration 
can also be partial; for example, the supplier (e.g. pig producer) takes a share in the demander (biogas 
installation).  
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3 Institutional issues 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This section discusses some institutional issues that are relevant to bio-based supply chains. Section 3.2 
concerns some of the institutional factors that play a role when starting a bio-based supply chain, and 
section 3.3 government policy as a special institutional factor. 
 
 
3.2 Institutional factors 
 
To start a bio-based supply chain, a number of partners have to coordinate their transactions (see for a 
discussion of coordination mechanisms and institutional factors Ménard, 2000 and Slangen et al., 2008). 
Coordination is especially important if investment decisions must be made simultaneously. An example is 
a biogas installation built together with a pig farm that delivers the manure for it. This implies that some 
amount of informal coordination is both inevitable and necessary. The parties involved thus need to trust 
each other. Trust is possible only if it is realised and acknowledged that partners can have different 
interests, cultures and backgrounds.  
 The complexity of setting up a bio-based supply chain also implies that the parties who will be involved 
in it have to be committed to the project. Commitment can be institutionalised by signing a contract 
and/or sharing costs. In practice, somebody has to take the lead to organise the setting up of the bio-
based supply chain. This can be somebody appointed by the initiators of the supply chain. Leadership 
(Andersen, 2006) requires commitment, mediation skills, organisation skills, etc. If somebody is hired, it 
also implies costs.  
 
 
3.3 Government policies 
 
Government policies can play an important role in setting-up a bio-based supply chain, and these policies 
can profoundly affect its success. Two important ways in which a government affects the functioning of a 
bio-based supply chain are through permits and subsidies.  
 
Permits 
Because bio-based supply chains are often a new institutional form, problems are likely to occur as a 
result of a lack of government regulations or due to inadequate regulations. To signal and overcome these 
problems with legislation, government involvement at an early stage is an important success factor. It can 
take a long time to obtain the required permits. Moreover, a wide range of matters have to be dealt with 
before permits are issued. For example, investment plans must contain an environmental impact analysis, 
like the milieu-effect rapportages in the Netherlands (VROM, 2010). 
 
Subsidies 
It is sometimes possible to receive government subsidies. For example, to stimulate sustainable energy 
production, the Dutch government runs the Stimulering Duurzame Energieproductie (SDE; Stimulation of 
Sustainable Energy) scheme, currently SDE+. This is an exploitation subsidy that is provided to producers 
of sustainable energy. The period over which the subsidy is provided depends on the technical lifespan of 
the production facility; there is a maximum of 12 years for energy production from biomass.1 
                                                 
1 The description of the SDE, MIA, VAMIL and EIA in this paragraph is based on the 2010 situation. Recently there have been some 
changes. 
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 The scheme was launched in April 2008 as the successor to the Milieukwaliteit Electriciteitsproductie 
(MEP; Environmental Quality Electricity Production) regulation. The differences between the two subsidies 
are that, in contrast to the MEP subsidy, the amount of the SDE subsidy is dependent on the electricity 
and gas market price and has a maximum (Agentschap NL, 2010). The subsidy is for each kWh 
of electricity produced. Three other regulations that might be relevant to Dutch producers and consumers 
of sustainable energy are the MIA, the VAMIL and the EIA (Agentschap NL, 2010; VROM, 2010). These 
financial instruments offer fiscal advantages to entrepreneurs who invest in facilities and equipment that 
are environmentally friendly (MIA, VAMIL) or who improve energy efficiency or sustainability (EIA). 
Entrepreneurs can deduct a percentage of the investment from their taxable income. 
 The MIA and VAMIL regulations are applicable only to facilities and equipment that are on the Milieulijst 
(environment list). Examples of facilities eligible for the MIA or the VAMIL are a system for the utilisation by 
greenhouse companies of CO2 from third parties (40%; MIA and VAMIL), a production facility for 
composting organic waste (15%; MIA) and a production facility for the processing of by-products or 
residues from agriculture or aquaculture (15%; MIA and VAMIL). The EIA regulation is applicable only to 
facilities and equipment that are on the Energielijst (energy list). Examples are a CHP installation, a boiler 
heated with biomass and a biofuel (including biogas) production facility. 
 One of the problems with government legislation and subsidies is that they can change over time: time 
inconsistency on the part of the government or government failure is an institutional risk. Such uncertainty 
can lead to extra costs (or benefits).  
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4 Uncertainty and risk 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The transition from a fossil-based economy to a bio-based economy requires new forms of production 
and increases the interactions between, for example, primary agricultural production and other industries. 
This process involves many stakeholders who jointly and/or individually take their decisions. Since the 
production technology and interactions are new, their future outcomes are at least partially unknown to the 
stakeholders. Considerations on risk and uncertainty can therefore play a major role in their decision-
making processes. Section 4.2 presents and discusses some categories of uncertainty and risk. 
 
 
4.2 Categories of uncertainty and risk 
 
Although 'risk' and 'uncertainty' are quite often used interchangeably, the distinction between the two is 
an important issue in modelling (e.g. Vose, 2006). For a working definition, we can consider uncertainty 
a lack of information or control, which implies unknown outcomes of decisions, and risk a probabilistic 
representation of the uncertainties in terms of well-defined outcomes. More specifically, we can consider 
risk the probability and magnitude of potentially undesirable outcomes. Following this distinction, high 
uncertainty may function as a stimulus for the adventurous 'first movers' to seize the opportunity in order 
to capitalise on favourable future events, while high risk can hinder the transition process due to fear of 
severe losses in the future.  
 Based on the nature of the causal factors, three categories of uncertainty can be distinguished: 
technical, market and institutional uncertainty. These uncertainties can result in a wide range of risks, 
such as production risk, price risk, financing risk, personal risk and liability risk. Liability risk deserves to 
receive particular attention from parties collaborating in a supply chain. An overview of the key features is 
given in Table 4.1. 
 
Table 4.1 Overview of uncertainty and risk in various categories 
Category Technical Market Institutional 
Uncertainty  -  Resources (availability, quality, 
etc.) 
 
-  Production process 
 (quantity, quality, efficiency, 
continuity, etc.) 
 
-  Logistics (storage, 
transportation, etc.) 
-  General market performance 
 
-  Input market (existence, 
pricing, information) 
-  Output market (demand, price, 
competition, etc.) 
-  Capital market (credit 
availability, interest rate, etc.) 
-  Governmental regulations 
 (Policy objectives, instruments) 
 
-  NGOs (goal, projects) 
 
-  Social values 
-  Collaboration with other parties in 
the supply chain 
Risk -  Shortage of resources 
-  Low production level 
-  Low conversion efficiency  
-  Low cash flow 
-  Market malfunctions 
-  Negative profit (cannot cover 
investment costs) 
-  Incurring liability  
-  Project becomes  
 socially undesirable 
 not profitable without subsidy, etc. 
 
 Uncertainties arise due to the use of bio-based products as inputs, biological processes as new 
conversion processes and novel bio-based products as marketed outputs. In terms of interactions 
between primary agricultural production and other industries, the introduction of bio-based production can 
alter existing supply and demand relationships and require new forms of cooperation between producers 
and other institutions. Government policies can also play a role. 
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 With regard to inputs, risk can arise due to the shortage of suitable biomass (no supply), and price 
volatility created by alternative/competitive use of the biomass. During the production process, the new 
technology can have unstable production levels or high failure rate of production. From the output side, 
market prices for the bio-based outputs can be strongly influenced by the volatile development of energy 
markets and the prices of competitive products. 
 
 
4.3 Risk assessment 
 
The stakeholders we consider can be individual firms that are considering starting or switching to a bio-
based production process (e.g. a bio-refinery), a network of firms that are joining forces to organise new 
production processes (e.g. an integrated agropark), or government and other public or private 
organisations that want to promote the transition process. Although they are a common issue for all 
stakeholders, risk and uncertainty may take different forms and have different implications for different 
stakeholders according to their decision problems. It is therefore important to specify the stakeholders 
and their decision problems for more detailed analysis and modelling.  
 Risk analysis is important for both policymakers and investors/firms. For policymakers, it is important 
to know the nature and magnitude of the risk in order to create or select relevant policy instruments. For 
firms, before a decision is made to switch to bio-based production, it is important to know the potential 
consequences of the decision. Risk analysis can help to identify the determinants of the risk through 
sensitivity analysis. However, sensitivity analysis has its shortcomings: it does not take into account the 
probabilities of occurrence of the events, or the correlations among the variables. The practice of varying 
the values of sensitive variables by standard percentages does not necessarily bear any relation to the 
observed or likely variability of the underlying variables (Belli et al., 2001). 
 Simulation models (e.g. with @Risk) are the only simple and generally applicable tool for overcoming 
the limitations of sensitivity analysis, calculating the expected net present value (NPV) and analysing risk. In 
Monte Carlo simulation, the computer acts as though we were implementing the same project hundreds or 
thousands of times under the specified conditions. Because we assume that some of the project variables 
are uncertain, the simulated results are different each time. The NPV may sometimes be negative, and 
sometimes be highly positive. The computer pools the results to obtain an estimate of the average result 
and of its probability distribution. From the simulations, the computer generates a probability distribution 
for the NPV, including the probability that the project is a failure (negative NPV) and the expected NPV. The 
technique requires additional information and expert judgement concerning the probability distributions of 
the critical project components. In @Risk, the correlation between variables can be modelled by specifying 
a correlation coefficient. For example, if we expect that increased production of bio-based products will 
cause the price to drop, we can specify a negative correlation coefficient. 
 Figure 4.1 shows the outcome of a hypothetical Monte Carlo simulation. The distribution of the NPV 
provides information on the possible spread of the economic results. In the simulated output below (1000 
iterations), the 90% confidence interval is approximately 33,300-44,900 euros. This indicates the mostly 
likely range of the outcomes. 
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Figure 4.1 Net present value of a hypothetical bio-based supply chain; outcome of a Monte Carlo 
simulation 
 
 
 The distribution is particularly useful when the decision-maker is more interested in the downside 
outcomes. For example, what is the chance that the NPV is lower than 45,000 euros? This is shown in 
Figure 4.2. In this case, it is 95.5%. 
 
Figure 4.2 Probability that the net present value of a hypothetical bio-based supply chain is lower 
than 45,000 euros; outcome of a Monte Carlo simulation 
 
 
 It is of course possible to create distributions for cash flow and NPVs per year, so that timing 
decisions (in which year and at what price to start) can be incorporated into the decision-making process. 
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5 Checklist and example 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
In this section we present a checklist that can be used in the process of setting up a bio-based supply 
chain. Most of the factors on this list have been discussed in the previous sections. In that sense, the 
checklist summarises the most important factors that have to be taken into account. To give an idea of 
what a bio-based supply chain is, we briefly discuss an agropark that integrates pig farming and green-
house horticulture, together with a number of supporting services and industries (Van Baardwijk et al., 
2003; Van Gendt et al., 2003). This agropark can be perceived as a specific form of a bio-based supply 
chain. Section 5.2 presents the checklist. Section 5.3 describes the agropark. 
 
 
5.2 Checklist  
 
The checklist consists of economic factors, institutional factors on the level of the organisations 
participating in the bio-based supply chain, government policy as an external institutional factor, 
technological factors, organisational factors and various other factors (Peerlings, 2009; Waltz, 2008). 
There is not always a clear distinction between the various categories. 
 
Economic factors 
- Level and variability of prices. The level and variability of output prices and variable input prices largely 
determine the profitability of the operations in a bio-based supply chain. 
- Input/output. Guarantee of availability of inputs and supply of outputs. Given the interdependence 
between operations in a bio-based supply chain, a guaranteed supply of inputs can be a problem. 
For example, a fermentation plant using manure from a dairy requires a continuous supply, while the 
quantity of manure supply is typically not constant. This can cause problems and may require storage 
capacity and/or supply from outside the supply chain. Supply could be assured by contracts. 
- Investment costs. To start a bio-based supply chain requires investment in land and operations. Some 
of these investments will be joint investments by different stakeholders. These investments imply 
costs. An important aspect here is asset specificity; that is, when the investment is made it cannot be 
used for something else. It could be that stakeholders are reluctant to make these investments as they 
imply that they become sunk costs and lock in the stakeholder. Being locked-in means that it is costly 
to end a relationship. 
 
Institutional factors at the level of the participants 
- Initiative. All the entrepreneurs involved in a bio-based supply chain eventually have to make a profit. 
The supply chain has to be able to realise enough revenue to cover the operational and overhead costs 
of the participants. Realising a bio-based supply chain will be easier if the initiative is being planned by 
the entrepreneurs who want to cooperate. They have more information about what is technically 
possible and about the costs and benefits than outsiders (e.g. the government).  
- Trust. Setting up a bio-based supply chain is complex and informal coordination is needed. The parties 
involved therefore need to trust each other.  
- Commitment. This is a crucial factor in the success of setting-up a bio-based supply chain. Some 
parties want to be involved in order to inform themselves or to learn something, but are not really 
interested in participating. Commitment has to be formalised at an early stage. This can be done by 
signing a contract and/or sharing investments or costs. 
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- Leadership. Somebody has to organise and take the lead in setting up the bio-based supply chain. This 
can be somebody appointed by the initiators of the chain. Leadership requires commitment, mediation 
skills, organisation skills, etc. If somebody is hired, it also implies cost. 
- Culture and background. Setting up a bio-based supply chain is by definition a cooperation between 
various parties. It has to be realised and acknowledged that they can have different interests, cultures 
and backgrounds. Mutual understanding is an important success factor. 
 
Government policy as an institutional factor 
- Government involvement. Because bio-based supply chains often take a new institutional form, 
problems can be expected due to a lack of government regulations or due to inadequate regulations. 
To signal and overcome these problems with legislation, government involvement at an early stage is 
a factor that positively contributes to the success of setting up a bio-based supply chain. 
- Permits. It can take a long time to obtain the required permits. Moreover, a wide range of matters 
have to be dealt with before permits are granted. 
- Subsidies. Government subsidies might be available. For example, electricity production might be 
subsidised. 
- Time inconsistency. The problem with government legislation and subsidies is that they can change 
over time. So there are risks, which can lead to extra costs (or benefits). 
 
Technological factors 
- Established or new techniques. Because bio-based supply chains often involve a new institutional 
setting, they can involve new technology. In almost all cases, commodities (e.g. heat, manure) will 
be transported between the operations. A bio-based supply chain therefore requires technological 
solutions. In addition, it takes a while before operations run in a technologically efficient and effective 
way. 
- Time between investment and operational technology. Given the relatively new character and unique 
features of each bio-based supply chain, a relatively long period between initiative and realisation can 
be expected. It takes a relatively long time to plan, to get all the required permits and to implement 
the plans (see previous point).  
 
Organisational factors 
- Business plan. A good business plan is required at an early stage in order to see whether the bio-
based supply chain is feasible from an economic point of view and to communicate to all stakeholders 
the relevant strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats.  
- The coordination mechanism has to be chosen. How will cooperation and coordination take place? 
How will this be legally organised? Who will be the partners, what is their legal status, is decision 
making hierarchical or not? How will agreements be formalised (contracts, legal entities, etc.)? 
How will agreements be enforced? Entry/exit strategy? 
- How will the day-to-day decision-making be organised? Who will be responsible for what? 
 
Other factors 
- Opposition. Many people have a negative opinion about large-scale food production, especially 
intensive livestock production. This implies that bio-based supply chains can encounter opposition from 
various groups in society. It is not always clear where this negative attitude arises from. People may 
(justly or unjustly) fear that there will be more transport movements, more emissions of pollutants, bad 
smells, the transmission of diseases, etc. However, the negative attitude can also arise from the 
(correct or incorrect) idea that large-scale operations are worse for animal welfare, the environment, 
etc. It is too simple to say that this is just a communication problem. 
- Location. There are often external economies of scale in agricultural production. If firms that produce 
similar goods cluster (e.g. pig or poultry clusters), the costs of inputs are often lower and the prices of 
outputs higher, transport costs are lower, knowledge diffusion goes faster, etc. Given this, the location 
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of a bio-based supply chain is important. A location that is relatively far from traditional production 
areas makes realisation more difficult and the expected profits lower. However, there can be 
advantages, for example, from an environmental point of view. For instance, being located outside a 
manure surplus region can lower manure disposal costs, and vice versa decrease incomes from 
manure for the digester. 
 
 
5.3 Agropark 
 
An agropark is a spatial clustering of agriculture and other businesses and services that cooperate and 
produce in a sustainable and environmentally friendly way. The involved companies can benefit from each 
other and provide additional services to the community. Agroparks basically consist of one or more 
(combined) bio-based supply chains. In the Netherlands, there are several initiatives for the development of 
agroparks. So far, only a few of these initiatives have been (or are being) implemented, mainly because of 
on-going debates on social concerns regarding such issues as landscape pollution and animal welfare.  
 An example of an agropark is the integration of pig farming and greenhouse horticulture, together with 
a number of supporting services and industries (Van Baardwijk 2003; Van Gendt et al., 2003). The agro-
park is represented in Figure 5.1. The pig farm includes the production (breeding) and the finishing of 
pigs. It receives breeding sows and supplies pigs for slaughtering. Waste products are manure and straw, 
as well as dead pigs. The manure (including the straw) is fermented in a manure digester which produces 
biogas and a residual, which is further processed into fertiliser, water and sludge.  
 Greenhouse horticulture provides added value to the agropark as it can utilise heat and biogas as well 
as the fertiliser produced by the digester. Thereby, the transport costs of these products are minimised. 
Different types of greenhouse horticulture are possible, but greenhouse vegetable production fits best, 
given its energy and fertiliser consumption. Moreover, the waste product of greenhouse vegetable 
production can be used in feed production. Greenhouse horticulture also plays an important role in the 
agropark's emission balance, as the pig farm compensates for the production of CO2. Furthermore, if built 
on top of the pig farm, the greenhouse can benefit from the heat produced by the pigs.  
 In addition to pig farming, fermentation and greenhouse horticulture, a number of other industries and 
business can be located at the agropark to create more closed cycles. These are, for instance, a 
slaughterhouse, carcass destructor (for the destruction of dead pigs as well as slaughter waste), a water 
treatment facility, cold storage and feed industry. Note that the businesses in an agropark may represent 
more than one farm or firm. 
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Figure 5.1 Schematic representation of an agropark (example) 
 
 
 Combining pig farming and greenhouse is just one example of an agropark; other possibilities are, for 
instance, 'greenparks' - in which agricultural crop production is the main activity - or 'agro-specialty parks', 
which focus on high-quality combined processing of agricultural products. De Wilt and colleagues (2000) 
provide a more detailed description of several types of agroparks. Agroparks as described here are 
currently being developed at several locations in the Netherlands, although the spatial clustering of 
activities is still relatively limited. For instance, a cluster of three companies (pig farm, chicken farm and 
digester) is being realised in North Limburg.  
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6 Modelling the bio-based supply chain 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This section discusses two explicit modelling issues: the choice between a contract and a free market in 
a bio-based supply chain (section 6.2), and the decision how much to produce in a bio-based supply chain 
(section 6.3). For this purpose, a mathematical programming model that incorporates risk is discussed. 
 
 
6.2 Free versus contract market 
 
Description 
Figure 6.1 is a graphical representation of a bio-based supply chain. In it, a pig farm produces pigs as well 
as manure, which is processed in a biogas installation. This installation produces electricity, which is sold. 
Their link is through the demand and supply of manure. 
 
Figure 6.1 A simple bio-based supply chain 
 
 
Scenarios and results 
 
The owners or managers of the pig farm and the biogas installation face the problem of determining the 
price of manure in their transactions. It could be the (uncertain) market price or they could negotiate a 
fixed price. This section presents some scenarios and discusses the simulation results. We start with a 
simple numerical example. 
 
Scenario 1: free market 
In the first scenario we assume that the price of manure is exogenously determined and uncertain. This 
represents a situation where the supplier of manure (pig farm) and the processor (biogas installation) 
coordinate their transactions via a market. They both have the possibility to supply to or demand from 
other firms. 
 
Scenario 2: contract 
In the second scenario, demander and supplier conclude a contract in which they agree that the manure 
produced on the pig farm will be processed in the biogas installation. So both demand and supply are 
fixed. Moreover, they agree on the price. The price is determined such that a minimum level of income 
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for both demander and supplier are guaranteed. Potential losses and gains compared to scenario 1 are 
calculated. They can be perceived as the 'price' of having zero price and quantity risk. Contracts have also 
an implicit benefit since they reduce the transactions costs. 
 
Results 
The first column of Table 6.1 shows the probabilities that a certain price (given in column 2) occurs. 
Columns 3 and 6 give the profit of the pig farm and biogas installation, respectively. For the pig farm, a 
lower price of manure disposal increases profit, and vice versa. For the biogas installation, a higher price 
of manure disposal increases profit, and vice versa. The expected profit (weighting profits with 
probabilities) for the pig farm is 6.58 and for the biogas installation 2.1.  
 
Table 6.1 Set 1 of hypothetical outcomes of scenario 1 
Prob. Price Pig farm Biogas installation 
Profit Perceived profit Profit -  
expected profit 
Profit Perceived profit Profit -  
expected profit 
0.01 1 12 16 5.42 -5 -15 -7.10 
0.05 2 11 14 4.42 -2 -6 -4.10 
0.10 3 9 10 2.42 -1 -3 -3.10 
0.15 4 8 8 1.42 0 -2 -2.10 
0.40 5 7 4 0.42 2 -1 -0.10 
0.15 6 5 2 -1.58 3 2 0.90 
0.10 7 3 0 -3.58 6 6 3.90 
0.05 8 0 -2 -6.58 8 10 5.90 
0.01 9 -4 -8 -10.58 10 14 7.90 
  6.58 4.78  2.10 0.09  
 
 In some cases, it is not profit but the 'value' or utility attached to profit that matters. Let us express 
this utility in monetary terms and call it perceived profit. Columns 4 and 7 give the perceived profit or 
utility in monetary terms. Notice that this does not change the ranking. Here, the expected perceived 
profits are lower than the expected profits, because losses are assumed to be valued more negatively 
than profits are valued positively. In a more realistic model/example, we could specify a utility function of 
income here. 
 The most likely price to occur is 5. Columns 5 and 8 give the difference in profit for each price 
compared to the expected profit. For example, for the first number in column 5 we have: 12 - 6.58 equals 
5.42. A price with a positive number shows that when this price is agreed in a contract, this is more 
profitable than relying on the free market (and getting the expected profit). Table 6.1 shows that for the 
pig farm the price has to be 5 or lower, while for the biogas installation the price has to be 6 or higher. 
This shows there is no price that the pig farm and biogas installation could agree on in a contract that 
would be attractive for both of them. If we take the perceived profit, there is also no room for negotiation: 
for the pig farm the price has to be 4 or lower, while for the biogas installation it has to be 6 or higher.  
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Table 6.2 Set 2 of hypothetical outcomes of scenario 1 
Prob Price Pig farm Biogas installation 
Profit Profit - expected profit Profit Profit - expected profit 
0.01 1 19 3.55 -6 -8.10 
0.05 2 18.5 3.05 -3 -5.10 
0.1 3 18 2.55 -2 -4.10 
0.15 4 17.5 2.05 0 -2.10 
0.4 5  17 1.55 2 -0.10 
0.15 6 16.5 1.05 3 0.90 
0.1 7 16 0.55 6 3.90 
0.05 8 -16 -0.55 8 5.90 
0.01 9 -16.5 -1.05 10 7.90 
  15.45  2.10  
 
 The example in Table 6.2 shows that for the pig farm, a price of 7 or below gives a profit higher than 
the expected profit. For the biogas installation, a price of 6 or higher delivers a profit higher than the 
expected profit. So 6 or 7 are prices that deliver a higher than expected profit for both firms. The pig 
farm prefers a price of 6, the biogas installation a price of 7. So, the negotiation space lies between 
these two prices. 
 
Figure 6.2 Profit minus expected profit for two different set of outcomes in terms of profit for 
the pig farm in scenario 1 
 
 
 Figure 6.2 shows the difference in profit at different prices compared to the expected profit. In the 
case of the outcomes of Table 6.1, the line intersects below the line, indicating that the profits are equal. 
There is no room for negotiation in that case. In the case of the outcomes of Table 6.2, the lines intersect 
above the line, indicating that the profits are equal. There is therefore room for negotiation. 
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 The discussion above shows that it could be that within a certain range of prices, profit for both trading 
partners is higher than expected profit. Concluding a contract with a fixed price that fits within this price 
range is profitable for both trading partners. Given that perceived profit can be different from the actual 
profit, the price range can be different. However, there could be also other reasons to conclude a 
contract. The main reason is security of supply. In that case, the model shows what the price in terms of 
loss in profit is of achieving this security.  
 
 
6.3  Model with risk 
 
Graphical description  
In the model, an individual firm maximises profit given a technology constraint and a market constraint. A 
market constraint indicates whether the price of an input or output is exogenous (externally determined) 
for a firm. The model is a mathematical programming model. The advantage of this type of model is that it 
can very easily include all kind of technical and institutional restrictions. An important aspect of the model 
is that it enables analysis of the effects of price fluctuation and technology uncertainty. The model would 
also allow the optimisation of something other than profit; for example, it would allow the maximisation of 
turnover or the minimisation of cost given a certain level of output. 
 Figure 6.3 shows a firm that produces three outputs with two 'activities'. One output is a regular one 
(output 1) and two outputs are bio-based (outputs 2 and 3). Producing the regular output yields bio-based 
waste in a fixed proportion. Producing the regular output is done in activity 1 using three inputs, two of 
which are variable (inputs 1 and 2 in Figure 6.1); the other is a fixed input that can be used in both 
activity 1 and activity 2. The bio-based outputs are produced in activity 2 using the bio-waste from 
activity 1, a variable input (input 3, e.g. other waste material) and the fixed input. It is assumed that 
outputs 2 and 3 are produced in a fixed proportion. 
 
Figure 6.3 Firm with two activities 
 
 
 For example, activity 1 is a vegetable processing industry; the two inputs are vegetables and other 
variable inputs. The regular output is semi-manufactured vegetables. The waste is bio-waste. Activity 2 
is a digester. It uses both bio-waste from activity 1 and bio-waste from other companies (input 3, in 
Figure 6.3). It is assumed that both groups of waste are imperfect substitutes. The digester produces 
electricity and residuals in a fixed proportion. 
 In the model it is assumed that the firm has some expectations about the level of future input and 
output prices, but that the actual prices can differ from these expectations. In the model it is also included 
that the firm has some expectations about some variables in the model that determine the technology 
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and its performance, but that the actual technical performance can differ from these expectations. More 
specifically, the proportion of waste and output 1, and the proportion of output 2 and output 3 is assumed 
to be uncertain to a certain degree.  
 
Mathematical description 
In the mathematical model, it is assumed that the firm maximises the present value of profit of both 
activities. Profit is defined as revenue minus paid costs. Costs consist of variable costs and of fixed costs. 
Part of the fixed costs is already incurred in the period before the activities start. This could be considered 
as investment cost. Profit is maximised given the technology of both activities. Technology is described 
with two Cobb-Douglas production functions (with constant returns to scale). The model is given by 
equations 6-14. 
 
1, 2, 1, 2,
1 , 1, 2 , 2 , 2 , 2 , 1, 1, 2, 2, 3, 3,
0, , , 1
max
(1 )t t t t
T
a t t a t a t b t b t t t t t t t t
t ty y x x t
p y p y p y w x w x w x C
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r= =
+ + − − − − 
− +  + 
∑  (6) 
0.5 0.4 0.2
1, 1, 2, 1,2t t t ty x x z≤  (7) 
1 , 1,a t ty yα=  (8) 
1 , 1,(1 )b t ty yα= −  (9) 
0.6 0.3 0.2
2, 1 , 3, 2,3t b t t ty y x z≤  (10) 
2 , 2,a t ty yβ=  (11) 
2 , 2,(1 )b t ty yβ= −  (12) 
1, 2,t t tz z z= +  (13) 
1, 2, 1, 2, 3,, , , , 0t t t t ty y x x x ≥  (14) 
 
Where: 
 
tC  fixed cost in year t; 1 ,a tp  price output a of activity 1 in year t; 1 ,a ty  quantity output a of activity 1 in 
year t; 2 ,a tp  price output a of activity 2 in year t; 2 ,a ty  quantity output a of activity 2 in year t; 2 ,b tp  
price output b of activity 2 in year t; 2 ,b ty  quantity output a of activity 2 in year t; 1,tw  price of input 1 in 
year t; 1,tx  quantity input 2 in year t; 2,tw  price of input 2 in year t; 2,tx  quantity input 2 in year t; 3,tw  
price of input 3 in year t; 3,tx  quantity input 3 in year t; 1,tz  quantity of fixed input used in activity 1 in 
year t; 2,tz  quantity of fixed input used in activity 2; tz  total quantity of fixed input, r discount rate, 
,α β  shares in aggregate outputs. 
 
 Equation 6 gives profit to be maximised. Equations 7-9 describe the technology of activity 1. A Cobb-
Douglas production function describes the production of the aggregate output of activity 1 (equation 7). 
Aggregate output is divided proportionally into two sub-outputs, a regular output a and waste (output b) in 
equations 8 and 9. Activity 1 uses three inputs: two variable inputs and one fixed input. The production of 
the aggregate output of activity 2 is described by equation 10. The aggregate output of activity 2 is 
divided proportionally into two sub-outputs a and b (equations 11 and 12). Activity 2 also uses three 
inputs, one of them being waste (sub-output b of activity 1) and one being a fixed input. Both activities 
compete for the fixed input (equation 13). Outputs and inputs are non-negative (equation 14).  
 Prices of the variable inputs and outputs are assumed to be determined outside the model. In the 
model, the firm has some expectations about these prices, but the actual prices can differ from these 
expectations. In the model, it is also assumed that the values of  (shares in aggregate outputs) are 
uncertain. Uncertainty is modelled by assuming that prices and ,α β  are normally distributed with a mean 
andα β
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and standard deviation. From these distributions a number of draws is made. In each draw a set of input 
and output prices and ,α β  is selected. For each set the model outcomes are determined. So, profit is 
maximised given the market (prices) and technology constraints. Finally, the average outcome and its 
standard deviation are calculated for each year over all draws. This procedure of drawing from 
distributions for some exogenous variables is a form of Monte Carlo simulation. We make the assumption 
that a draw is independent of other draws. For example, in a 4-year period model there are 1000 draws 
per year, so in total the model is solved 4000 times with alternative sets of prices and ,α β 's. In the 
model it is possible to have for each year a certain expectation (mean) and standard deviation. This, for 
example, enables taking into account that price uncertainty is larger in future years than at present, while 
for technological uncertainty this might be vice versa. To avoid unrealistic values of prices and ,α β 's 
minimum and maximum values can be included. 
 
Subsidies 
It is possible to perform all kinds of scenario analyses with the model. For example, two types of subsidies 
can be introduced into the model. First, there can be a subsidy that lowers fixed costs. This subsidy does 
not alter the production decisions; it only influences the decision whether production will take place. An 
example of such a subsidy would be an investment subsidy or a subsidy that lowers the cost of obtaining 
the required permits. Second, we can also introduce a price subsidy for both variable inputs and outputs. 
Subsidies can be ad valorem (percentage of price) or fixed (an absolute amount per unit of output or 
input). A price subsidy on an input lowers the price of that input in an activity and makes the production of 
the outputs of that activity more attractive. A subsidy on the price of an output directly increases the 
production of the activity that produces the subsidised output. 
 Other scenarios could focus on the effects of uncertainty in order to, for example, compare the effects 
of two different risk perceptions on prices. 
 
Scenarios 
The baseline situation (hypothetical case) is described in section 6.2. In order to establish how risks might 
impact returns, the model can be used to run different scenarios or parameter sensitivity analyses. 
Sensitivity analysis can help decision makers to prioritise actions or conclude 'better' contracts. To 
illustrate the model, we define four scenarios: 
- An annual 10% price subsidy on the bought bio-based input in activity 2. What are the effects of a 10% 
subsidy on 3,t
w
? 
- An annual 10% subsidy on the price of the bio-based output a of activity 2. What are the effects of a 
10% subsidy on 2 ,a t
p
? 
- A 50% investment subsidy that reduces the cost of building the plant. What are the effects of a 10% 
subsidy on ? 
- A quantitative limit on the use of the bought bio-based input in activity 2. What is the effect? 
 
 We impose the condition that the use of the bought bio-based input is smaller than or equal to 0.08 
(it is higher than the initial mean usage, but smaller than the maximum use (about half)). We compare the 
outcomes with the base run. We assume a five-year time period. In year t=0 the investment is made and in 
years t=1 till t=4 the firm operates. In the model the length of the time period can be freely chosen. 
 
Results 
 
Scenario 1: 10% subsidy on variable input in activity 2 
Table 6.3 shows the results. The subsidy on the variable input in activity 2 reduces the price of this input. 
As a result, more of it is used in activity 2 (18.81%). Given that the input is a substitute for the bio-based 
product (waste) produced by activity 1 (output b), less of the latter input will be used in activity 2. 
However, because of the increase in the profitability of activity 2, more of the bio-based product produced 
0.tC =
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by activity 1 is demanded. The total effect is a 1.17% increase. Since the production in activity 2 has 
become more attractive, the shadow price (profitability) of using the fixed input in activity 2 has increased. 
Therefore, its use increases by 3.19% in activity 2 while it decreases in activity 1 by 0.79% (total amount 
is fixed). As a result, the fixed input in activity 1 is substituted by variable inputs 1 and 2 (1.51% increase). 
The identical percentage increases are caused by the use of the Cobb-Douglas production functions. The 
subsidy results in a discounted expected profit increase of 10.84%. The expected profit increase in year 4 
is 1.95%. 
 Table 6.4 shows that the mean, minimum and maximum values of the discounted profit increase. If the 
discounted profit is normally distributed, then the probability that the total discounted profit is negative 
decreases from 21% to 19%. Of the 100 draws made, 17% result in a negative total discounted profit, 
compared to 19% in the base run. The negative total discounted profit is caused by the investment cost in 
year t=0. Profits in years t=1 till t=4 are all positive. 
 
Table 6.3 Percentage change compared to the base run in year t=4 (100 draws) 
Variable Scenario 1:  
10% subsidy variable input 
activity 2 
Scenario 2: 
10% subsidy output 2a 
Scenario 4: 
quantitative restriction 
variable input activity 2 
Output a, activity 1 0.99 2.22 -0.81 
Output b, activity 1 0.99 2.22 -0.81 
Output a, activity 2 6.81 7.68 -5.81 
Output b, activity 2 6.81 7.67 -5.81 
Use of fixed input in activity 1 -0.73 -1.58 0.31 
Use of fixed input in activity 2 3.15 6.83 -1.34 
Use of variable input 1 in activity 1 1.29 2.88 -1.26 
Use of variable input 2 in activity 1 1.29 2.88 -1.26 
Use of variable input in activity 2 18.70 15.32 -14.46 
Discounted profit 7.91 17.57 -0.44 
1: Here we take 100 draws per year to save solution time, but the number of draws can be increased to any number. 
 
Table 6.4 Discounted profit (100 draws) 
Variable Mean Minimum value Maximum value Standard deviation Probability 
negative value 
Percentage 
negative value 
Base 0.44 -0.30 2.56 0.52 21% 19% 
Scenario 1 0.47 -0.27 2.60 0.53 19% 17% 
Scenario 2 0.51 -0.24 2.66 0.54 17% 13% 
Scenario 3 0.94 0.20 3.06 0.52 4% 0% 
Scenario 4 0.43 -0.30 2.53 0.52 21% 19% 
 
Scenario 2: 10% subsidy on output 2a 
Results are comparable to the outcomes of scenario 1 (see Table 6.3 and 6.4). However, effects are 
larger, except for the increase in variable input in activity 2, which is less since there is no longer a price 
subsidy available for this input. The probability that discounted profit is negative is now 17% if the 
discounted profit is normally distributed. 13% of the draws resulted in a negative total discounted profit. 
 
Scenario 3: 50% investment subsidy 
Since with an investment subsidy relative prices do not change, the output and input levels remain the 
same. The annual profits also do not change (all remain positive). The only thing that changes is that the 
discounted profit increases by 115%. The probability that profit becomes negative is now only 4%. 
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Scenario 4: limit on the use of bought variable input in activity 2 
With a limit of 0.08 on the use of the bought variable input in activity 2, there is a quantitative restriction 
on the potential use of the bio-based input in activity 2. The restriction is binding for only a limited number 
of draws. If it is binding, less of the input will be used (see Table 6.4). On average, this leads to a 14.46% 
reduction in the use of the input. This has a negative effect on the level of outputs produced in activity 2  
(-5.81%). Although the input is partially substituted by the input produced by activity 1, the overall effect 
on the use of this input is negative (0.81%). In total, discounted profit decreases by 0.44%. 
 
Future research 
 
To focus on the modelling approach, we have made use of hypothetical data. However, we think that the 
modelling concepts can be applied to a wide range of real-world situations. Examples could be:  
a) deciding whether to invest in a bio-based firm;  
b) determining the effect of price fluctuations and uncertainty on the profitability, and  
c) determining optimal subsidy levels to achieve a certain policy goal, etc. 
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7 Conclusions 
 
 
This report on the economic and institutional factors that determine the costs and benefits of the various 
actors in new bio-based supply chains, with a special focus on risk, and on ways to model the economics 
of these supply chains, shows that there are alternative ways to coordinate demand and supply in bio-
based supply chains, and that the coordination mechanism chosen is largely determined by transaction 
costs and risk. To identify and understand the relevant risks and transaction costs, several institutional 
and economic factors that are relevant for bio-based supply chains have been identified and discussed. 
This resulted in a checklist of factors that have to be taken into account when setting up a bio-based 
supply chain.  
 Section 6 concerned two explicit modelling issues. First, the choice between a contract and a free 
market in a bio-based supply chain was discussed. This was followed by a discussion of a mathematical 
programming model that incorporates risk. This model can be used to study production decisions in a bio-
based supply chain under risk.  
 This report shows that many factors play a role in setting up bio-based supply chains. Especially the 
fact that both technology and products are relatively new increases uncertainty. The fact that biomass 
markets have been very volatile in recent years, just like the oil markets, also increases uncertainty and 
risk levels. Both government policies (e.g. subsidies) and special institutional arrangements (e.g. 
contracts) can reduce these risks. Given the complexity of each specific market, product, etc., specific 
problems that occur in bio-based supply chains require tailor-made solutions. 
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